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THE DEVELOPME�\JT OF THE ENGLISH USE 
FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII 
The Norman Conquest (1066) signified a new epoch in 
the evolution of the law of succession of real property in 
England. The introduction of the Norman brand of feudalism 
necessitated a revision in the primitive Anglo-Saxon mode 
f . 1 o succession.
The feudal system was necessarily dependent upon a 
stable chain of land ownership, and thus, the principle of 
primogeniture emerged as the dominant form of land convey-
2 
ance. By the end of the twelfth century it was held that, 
"God alone, and not man, can make an heir.113 Land pur­
chased during one's lifetime could be freely transferred, 
but wills and deathbed grants of property were forbidden. 
W. S. Holdsworth states that, "To recognize the interest 
of anyone not actually seised or entitled to a definite 
estate in land would be to encourage the evasion of obli­
gations upon the due performance of which a feudal society 
was based. 
The separation of the lay and ecclesiastical courts 
complicated the law of succession as they drew a distinction 
between real and personal property. Laws pertaining to 
land were molded by royal courts of common law and equity, 
whereas laws relevant to succession of chattels were based 
on Roman and canonical law as interpreted by the 
ecclesiastical courts. While testation of real property 
was prohibited by conunon law, the church encouraged the 
devise of personal property, and taught that dying without 
a will was similar to dying unconfessed.5 Thus, the medi­
eval concept of the testament was developed through the 
church and was exclusive of real property. 
Despite the conunon law prohibition of transferring 
lands in any way other than by livery of seisin, and 
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despite the insistence of transferring land at death through 
primogeniture, a method of conveying land from one man to 
another for the "use" of the first man or a third party 
developed shortly after the Conquest. The use was a method 
whereby the foeffor (landowner) vested the legal title of 
his land in one or more feoffees with the understanding that 
the land would be administered for the occupation and ben­
efit of the feoffor or his appointee, the cestui que use. 
By the sixteenth century there were many means of creating 
� 6 a use including feoffment to uses; implication of a use 
in conunon law conveyances such as fine, recovery, lease, 
release, and grant; 7 oral or written agreement through
bargain and sale; and through a resulting use.8 The use
was highly flexible because it was not directly affected by 
the common law doctrine of livery of seisin, and the use was 
highly desirable as, "uses could create equitable possessory 
estates, and equitable remainders, for years, for life, in 
fee tail and in fee simple corresponding to legal estates 
3 
and remainders.119 As we shall see, the use enabled one to
escape the burdens of feudal incidents, to devise land, and 
to create future interests. The courts of connnon law 
recognized only the legal interest of the feoffee to uses 
and did not require him to fulfill the terms of the use, 
but the Court of Chancery recognized the equitable interest 
of the cestui que use and compelled the feoffee to grant 
the beneficiary of the use access to the land and rents of 
the legal estate, to convey the legal estate according to 
the instructions of the cestui que use, and to defend the 
legal estate against the claims of third parties.10 There­
fore, "Conveyances in uses were like privileged places or 
liberties; for as there the law doth not run, so upon such 
conveyances the law could not take hold.1111 The use
brideed the gap between real and personal property as it 
provided the landowner a means of distributing his land 
which was as complete as that of any other type of property.
The use was employed in a variety of circumstances in 
the Middle Ages. Before departure upon foreign exploits, 
many Crusaders would convey their lands to friends upon 
. d" . . h f f 12 various con itions cast in t e orm o a use. In order 
to comply with poverty vows, Franciscan friars would trans­
fer legal property titles to a feoffee while retaining the 
benefits of and the right to use the land. This practice 
was consecrated by the papacy in the 1279 Bull Exilt qui 
seminat. 
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Uses were created in the event of bad guardianship. A 
statute passed in 1275 declared that when a guardian proved 
to be fraudulent, wardship would be transferred to another 
"to hold for the use of" the infant.13 Uses enabled land­
owners to escape many incidences of tenure, such as 
wardships, marriages, and fines, for these obligations 
arose only upon the transference of the legal estate, and 
if there were multiple feoffees, the legal estate would not 
expire at the death of the feoffer.14 Some utilized the
use to avoid payment of debts or to circumvent statutes of 
mortmain.15 Statutes enacted in 1377, 1379, 1448, and 1504
somewhat restricted fraudulent practices through uses but 
were unable to eliminate them. In 1392 making gifts to 
corporations through uses which violated restrictions of 
statutes of mortmain were prohibited. Finally, uses were 
incorporated as a means of devising property. A testator 
was able to convey his estate to others and designate in 
his will what persons, purposes, and times that the estate 
would be put to use. Thus, through the will and the use 
one could create interests realized in futuro.16 Though
the use served many functions, the ability to avoid feudal 
dues, to convey property by devise, and to create future 
interests were the most important. 
From the preceding paragraph we can infer that the use 
not only provided a highly elastic form of land conveyance, 
but that the use permitted several channels through which 
fraud could be perpetrated. The common law courts of the 
fifteenth century were unable to act against the use 
because laws regulating the use were insufficient to deal 
with the situation which arose from the use. The common 
law courts held that wills of reality were illegal and 
refused to recognize the position of the cestui que use. 
M. M. Bigelow states that the common law judges "would not
in any way, by direct mandate or through damages for breach
of trust, compell the feoffee to carry out the terms of
the devise.1117
In the absence of judgment by the common law courts, 
the Court of Chancery increasingly arbitrated disputes 
arising from uses. Though the Chancery was involved in 
cases involving uses as early as 1350, it was not until the 
first half of the fifteenth century that the chancellor's 
jurisdiction became firmly established over the feoffee 
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who failed to comply to the terms of the use, and that the 
rules defining the nature of relief were regularly system­
ized.18 The chancellor, operating on the premise that men 
should honor their word and should not be allowed to profit 
from a breach of faith, recognized the cestui que use as 
having a rightful claim to the benefits of the land in ques­
tion.19 The Chancery enforced the right_of the cestui que 
use's equitable ownership through fines and imprisonment. 
W. S. Holdsworth stnns up the advantages of the Chancery's 
jurisdiction of cases involving uses by stating that, 
Whether we look at the ethical principles upon which 
the chancellor interfered, or at the procedure of the 
court of chancery, or at its freedom from fixed forms 
of action, we can see that the chancellor and his 
court were as strikingly fitted as the common law and 
the common law courts were unfitted, to assume juris­
diction over the use.20 
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The Crown recognized the negative effects of the use 
before the reign of Henry VIII, and there were some efforts, 
through statute, to alleviate them. In 1485 the cestui que 
use was given the power to initiate a writ of formedon 
against anyone who was receiving his profits from the land. 
This statute is exemplary of the general trend to vest the 
. 
h f 1 1 h" · h · 21rig ts o ega owners ip in t e cestui que use. In 1483 
a statute gave the cestui que use the right to dispose of a 
legal estate. This statute was defective because it did 
not remove the power of the feoffee to dispose of the legal 
estate, and thus, considerable confusion arose from the 
possibility of two people disposing of the same estate. 
Nevertheless, the statute is important because it foreshad­
ows the Statute of Uses, and it points to many problems 
arising from the use. Other statutes pertaining to uses 
were passed in 1487, 1489, and 1504, but they did not enable 
the Crown to collect rights of wardship and marriage or 
escheat and forfeiture on a large scale basis, and were 
h f 
. . 
l 22 t ere ore inconsequentia . 
By the reign of Henry VIII the use was an established 
and protected mechanism which afforded the landowner a chan­
nel through which he could evade feudal incidents. Bigelow 
7 
states that: 
Feoffment to use had cut the nerve of tenure; the 
feudal lord had lost his revenues; he could not 
enforce his right to forfeitures, escheats, wardships, 
marriages and the like, - not against the feoffor 
because he had parted with the title to the lands in 
question; not against the feoffee to uses, for he 
virtually had nothing in the the lands; not against 
the cestui gtie use, for no feudal tie bound him to the 
injured lord.z3 
Uses also robbed the Crown of revenue, and as Henry VIII was 
desperately in need of finances, and as Parliament was 
becoming unsympathetic to his requests after having been 
pressured to resolve Henry's matrimonial problems and to 
instigate undesired policies of church reform, it was 
decided that the most lucrative channel of revenue would be 
through the enforcement of feudal dues, a valid source of 
income already at disposal. Therefore, Henry and his court 
lawyers concentrated upon devising a means to collect the 
dues which were avoided by the use for, as Theodore 
Plunkett states, "whoever gains by the arra.in3ment (uses) 
the Crown is sure to loose.1124 As we shall see, between 
1529 and 1535 Henry VIIIand his lawyers made various 
attempts to initiate legislation of a statute which would 
eliminate the loophole that the use provided through the 
separation of the legal and equitable titles of property 
ownership. The Statute of Uses (1535) was not only the 
culmination of these efforts; it is the basis of our modern 
definition of property. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE OF USES AND 
ITS EFFECTS ON ENGLISH LAW 
Although the subject of uses was debated in virtually 
every session of the Reformation Parliament: although the 
Crown and the peers of England entered into a treaty con­
cerning the right to convey land through uses: although 
statesmen such as Sir Thomas More and Thomas Cromwell were 
involved with the political aspects of procuring limitations
over uses: and although attempts to secure jurisdiction 
over uses set connnon law judges against judges of Chancery, 
there is little material surviving for the modern historian 
to trace the evolution of the Statute of Uses. Unfortu­
nately, the Connnons' Journals do not extend to the period 
in which the statute was conceived, the extant fragments 
of the Lords' Journals make no mention of the statute, and 
the roll of Parliament affords no significant information 
pertaining to the passage of the Statute of Uses.25 Thus, 
legal historians must depend upon proposed draft bills of 
statutes seeking to regulate uses, records of cases related 
to uses tried in the courts of common law, a few letters 
and papers which have survived, and occasional accounts of 
contemporary observers in attempting to reconstruct the 
events which led to the passage of the Statute of Uses. 
Many historians have dealt with the causes and effects 
of the Statute of Uses, yet few have offered comprehensive 
9 
interpretations. Sir Francis Bacon and Edward Coke were 
among the first lawyers to give readings upon the statute. 
Others such as J. A. Froude, A. F. Pollard, and F. W. 
Maitland have endeavored exegesis of the statute with vary­
ing results. The most widely accepted and the most 
comprehensive treatment of the Statute of Uses was presented 
by W. S. Holdsworth in his multivolumed work, A History of 
English Law. Holdsworth's basic thesis that the statute 
was the product of efforts of a strong willed king who 
bargained first with the nobility, and later with the common 
lawyers in order to secure passage of the statute remained 
above criticism until the later part of the 1960's.26 Since
then historians such as E. W. Ives, J. H. W. Bean, and 
Stanford E. Lehmberg have challenged Holdsworth's view. 
Citing evidence that Holdsworth was unaware of, these later 
historians posit that the Crown first appealed to the land­
owning class to compromise upon the issue of uses, and after 
the Crown's ventures proved unsuccessful, the Crown sought 
to resolve the issue through judicial action. The Crown was 
able to pit the comraon law judges against Chancery to obtain 
a decision in Lord Dacre's case (1534-35) which nullified 
certain uses and precipitated instability among owners of 
real property. Due to the precarious state of property 
ownership, the Commons was thus forced to pass the Statute 
of Uses. 
The purpose of the first part of this paper is to 
interpret the events leading to the passage of the Statute 
of Uses while o�fering a synthesis, and, in some places, 
an expansion of ideas proposed by divergent schools of 
thought in order to offer an accurate account of the 
evolution of the statute. A second section of this paper 
will assess the short and long term effects of the Statute 
of Uses. Criteria for judgment of the significance of the 
statute will include both the degree to which Henry VIII 
accomplished his purposes for pursuing land reform and the 
unanticipated consequences which the Statute of Uses stim­
ulated. 
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Between 1529 and 1536 the Crown initiated a large 
scale attack against the separation of the equitable and 
the legal titles of property through uses because this 
division of titles promoted secret conveyances and robbed 
the king of feudal incidents. During the years 1529 to 
1539 the Crown sought to alleviate the abuses caused by 
conveying land through uses by statutory reform. According 
to Holdsworth, the first of these attempts was a 1529 draft 
bill which "would have at once revolutionized and simpli­
fied the law.1127 The draft bill proposed that: For all
persons who were not peers there was to be only one type of 
estate in land, a fee simple. No uses were valid unless 
they were enrolled by an officer of the Court of Common 
Pleas. The deed was to be read and recorded in the parish 
church where the land was located. The lands of the peers 
were subject to feudal dues on both equitable and legal 
estates. No one could buy these lands without the king's 
license, and once sold through ordinary conveyance, the 
purchaser was to hold in fee simple. The lands of nobil­
ity within the rank of baron could be entailed, devised, 
and settled.28
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The 1529 draft bill is of questionable value and 
origin. Holdsworth feels that the bill was part of an 
agreement between the king and nobility, whereas Ives 
asserts that the draft bill, "looks less like an attempt of 
the government to simplify and reform the land law than a 
well intentioned but inexperienced proposal emanating from 
a private individual with a grievance about concealed 
titles.1129 While allowing for the fact that the format of
the draft bill was similar to other government bills of the 
period, Ives states that the bill proposed a complex and 
impracticable scheme of registration of conveyances, that 
it did not include legislation relating to primer seisin, 
and it was solely an attempt to alleviate abuses arising 
from secret conveyances contrived by entails, uses and for­
gery.30 The proposal which gives the bill its unusual 
character, a proviso permitting noblemen exclusive right of 
entail, from which Holdsworth claims that the Crown compro­
mised with nobility, is not part of the main body of the 
bill. In any event, the bill did not pass the Commons, and 
there were no attempts to alter or reintroduce it. If spon­
sored by the government, the 1529 draft bill was probably 
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not an integral component of the government's plan to remedy 
the evils of uses, and the bill was not part of a compro­
mise between king and nobility. At most, the draft bill 
was a predecessor of the Statute of Enrollments which was 
enacted in 1536.31
A t d . . . d
. 
1529 32 · f separa e ocument, initiate in , is o more
importance to the evolution of the Statute of Uses. This 
document is an agreement between Henry VIII, Lord Chan­
cellor Thomas More, and thirty peers. In twenty-three 
detailed articles, this document establishes the king's 
right to receive a fraction of feudal incidents in return 
for allowing the landowning class the flexibility inherent 
in the use. The compromise stipulated that land not set­
tled by use was to be subjugated to feudal incidents, but 
where land had been devised by use, the king was to have 
rights to only one-third of the incidents of tenure. The 
Crown was to have the wardship of all infant heirs of 
tenants-in-chief, regardless of whether the land was held 
in use or was a legal estate. Heirs who were of full age 
were required to pay the king one-half a year's profits 
upon suing out livery of th�ir lands.33 The agreement
between the Crown and the peers represents a compromise 
whereby the king surrendered one-half or two-thirds of his 
legal entitlement in return for the assurance that the 
remainder would be duly paid. 
The agreement contained concessions to all landowners, 
but the nobility stood to benefit most. Article 19 of the 
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agreement states that: 
the Kings highness is pleased that it shall be 
enacted that every of the said noble men, and all 
other his subjects and their heirs and successors of 
whom any lands or tenements be or shall be holden by 
knights service, shall have full benefit and profit of 
the wardship of the third part of the whole of the 
same lands as tenements holden to the King's subjects 
as the case shall require as said by the Articles as 
devised for the Kings highness, his heirs and succes­
sors of lands and tenements of him not holden in 
chief. 34 
Thus, the compromise granted both the king and the peerage 
the right to collect feudal dues. As this concession was 
made at the expense of all other landowners of the realm, 
it promised to be the source of opposition in the Commons. 
Although there is controversy over when the agreement 
was first introduced in the Commons, most scholars believe 
that it was initiated in the third session of the Reforma­
tion Parliament which began on January 15, 1532.35 It is
important to note that the draft bill submitted by Cromwell 
contained several alterations of the agreement between the 
Crown and nobility. Article 19 of the compromise was 
totally deleted from the text of the draft bill'. Further­
more, instead of asking for one-third of the feudal 
incidents, Cromwell probably submitted a bill calling for 
one-half. There is no surviving draft of this proposed 
legislation, but Edward Hall reports that "everyman might 
make his will of the halfe of his lande, so that he left 
the other halfe to the heyre by discent,1136 and adds that
he had been "credibly informed" that the Crown would accept 
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a third or a quarter. It therefore appears that the Crown 
usurped the agreed right of the lessor lords to demand 
feudal dues in order to increase the chances of the draft 
bill passing Commons, and that the Crown requested one-half 
share of incidents with the intention of "compromising" 
with the Commons for one-third, the fraction the Crown ini­
tially desired. 
According to Chapuys, the draft bill was the source of 
"strange words against King and Council" when it was read 
in the Commons. 37 Most members of the Commons held land
subject to tenure, and the bill before them would nullify 
much of the benefits of the use. Therefore, the Commons 
remained adamant in opposition to the draft bill, and as a 
result, precipitated a direct encounter with Henry VIII. 
Coming to present the Supplication against the Ordinaries, 
members of Commons were greeted with an ultimatum warning 
against opposition to the bill on feudal incidents. Henry 
reportedly declared: 
I have sent to you a byll concernynge wards and primer 
season, in the which thynges I am greatly wronged: 
Wherefore I have offered you reason as I thynke, yea, 
and so thynketh all the Lordes, for they have set 
their handes to the book: Therefore I assure you, if 
you wyll not take some reasonable ende now when it is 
offered, I wyll search out the extremitie of the lawe, 
and then wyll I not offre you so much agayne. 38 
Parliament was prorogued ten days after Henry VIII expressed 
his displeasure at the reluctance of the Commons to pass the 
draft bill. 
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The draft bill was reintroduced in the fourth session 
of Parliament where it fared substantially better, receiving 
two readings. Nevertheless, progress was much slower than 
the Crown desired, and as a result, Henry temporarily aban­
doned attempts to regulate uses through Parliamentary 
legislation. The Crown now pursued control of uses by 
seeking to obtain jurisdiction over them in the courts of 
law. 
The Crown's decision to seek jurisdiction over uses was 
probably initiated after Cromwell received information about 
a settlement made by Thomas Fiennes Lord Dacre of the South 
which promised to deprive the Crown of all feudal incidents. 
This information was obtained by Henry Polsted, a servant of 
Lord Dacre who was partially responsible for composing Lord 
Dacre's will.39 Thus, when Lord Dacre died, the Crown was
well prepared to challenge his settlement. 
On September 9, 1533 Thomas Fiennes, Lord Dacre, died 
leaving his estate, which included holdings in thirteen 
counties to his eighteen year old grandson, Thomas. As the 
majority of Lord Dacre's lands were held by feoffees to use, 
and as the settlement of Lord Dacre's estate completely 
robbed the king of feudal dues, the royal escheators 
declared the settlement collusive in their inquisition post 
mortem. As a result, the Crown sued for lost revenues in 
the Exchequer Chamber during the Trinity term of 1534. 
Royal lawyers asserted that Dacre's settlement was void not 
16 
only because his will was a deliberate attempt to defraud 
the king of wardship, but also because of the general prin-
ciple that land could not be devised by common law. 40 On
January 9, 1534 jurors of the Exchequer Chamber reached the 
decision that the will of Lord Dacre was made with intent to 
defraud the king of incidents and declared it void. At this 
time the feoffees of Lord Dacre appealed the Exchequer's 
decision in Chancery through a method known as a "traverse." 
The Chancery heard the case during the Easter term of 1535. 
The suit was the source of much contention, and initially 
the judges were evenly divided despite pressure from Crom­
well and Lord Chancellor Audley to conform to the Crown's 
wishes. At this time, "the Kyng called the Iudges and the 
best learned men of his Realme and thei disputed this 
matter in the Chauncery, and agreed that lande could not be 
willed by common law. ,.4l After deliberating the Dacre case
once more, the judges complied with Henry's wishes and 
upheld the verdict of the Exchequer Chamber. Thus, all 
evidence supports the fact that Chancery's verdict in 
Dacre's case was obtained through incessant pressure from 
the Crown, applied often by Henry VIII himself.42 The 
decision by Chancery to repudiate the Dacre settlement is 
monumental because it contradicted the precedents of the 
courts of common law and royal administrative policy since 
the late fourteenth century, and because the Chancellor, in 
asserting that a use was a collusive attempt to deprive the 
17 
Crovm of feudal revenues, abandoned precedents established 
over the last century and a half in order to promote a rule 
b d 1 1 1 
. 
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ase pure y upon extra- ega consi erations. 
The decision in the Dacre case threatened to undermine 
the basis of English property settlements. Neither the 
king nor his subjects were content with the outcome of the 
case because both parties were susceptible to losses and 
legal entanglements as the laws regarding property were now 
quite unstable. The Crown was not fully satisfied with the 
outcome of the Dacre case because the ruling was insuffi­
cient to secure mandatory payment of feudal incidents. 
Administrative delays and possible reversal of the decision 
in the Dacre case were forseen as royal officials would 
have to prove through individual post mortem investigations 
that collusion was intended by those who were accused of 
avoiding wardship. Furthermore, the Dacre case provided for 
the collection of wardship and marriage, but rights accruing 
when the heir reached legal age such as primer seisin, liv­
ery, and relief were not ensured by the ruling.44 As a
result of the Dacre decision those who held land belonging 
to the Crown forfeited the right to will their land if they 
had an heir under age, and they had no course of action 
against who chose to will land held in use. Thus, from the 
standpoint of the Crown and from the standpoint of the land­
owners, passage of a statute detailing the rights and 
obligations of uses was imperative. 
Although both the Crown and the landowners were 
adversely affected by the decision in Lord Dacre's case, 
18 
the landowners' situation was much more desperate than that 
of the Crown. Consequently, when Henry VIII opened the 
last session of the Reformation Parliament on February 4, 
15 36, he was confident that the battle against uses was won. 
Therefore, Henry proposed measures substantially more 
severe than his original plan of compromise with the nobil­
ity. These proposals constitute two draft bills45 which
contained provisions which would resolve the problem created 
by the division of the equitable and the legal title of 
property while retaining the use as a means to transfer 
land. The extent of Henry's control over the passage of 
this legislation is evidenced by the fact these draft bills 
differed in wording, but not in meaning, from the Statute 
of Uses that the Parliament enacted.46
The Statute of Uses is an exemplary model of sixteenth 
century legal draftsmanship. The quality of the draftsman­
ship of the Statute of Uses led Sir Francis Bacon to 
proclair.i that: 
This Statute is the most perfectly and exactly 
conceived and penned of any law in the book, induced 
with the most declaring and persuading pre�mble, 
consisting and standing with the most foreseeing and 
circumspect savings and provisos, and lastly, the best 
pondered in all the words and clauses of any statute 
that I find.47 
The preamble to the Statute of Uses contains a list of 
grievances and inconveniences caused by uses. Holdsworth 
19 
states that, "Like the preambles of other statutes of this 
period, it is far from being a sober statement of historical 
fact. Rather it is an official statement of the numerous 
good reasons which had induced the government to pass such a
wise statute Many of grievances cited in the pre-
amble originated from two memoranda, 'Inconvenience for suf­
ferance of uses' and 'Damna usum' ; 49 which were composed for 
Cromwell and Audley. Central to the statute's preamble is 
the grievance that: 
The lords have lost their wards, marriages,reliefs, 
heriots, aids pur faire filz chivalier and phr filmarier ... The king's highness hath lost t e prof­
its and advantages of the lands of persons attainted, 
and of the lands craftyly put in feoffments to uses 
of aliens born, and also the profits of waste for a 
year and a day of felons attainted, and the lords 
their escheats thereof.SO 
The effect of the preamble was to present a convincing, well 
detailed argument against uses which asserts that uses 
adversely affected virtually every class of Englishmen. Uses 
deprived the lords of wardship and feudal incidents, women 
of dowers, the king of collecting forfeitures, and the 
public because of the secrecy of the conveyance and its 
ability to avoid registration in a court of record. 
The main body of the Statute of Uses then endeavors to
remedy these evils. While neither invalidating previous 
uses nor eliminating future conveyances to uses, the statute 
severely undermined the benefits of the use. Fundamentally, 
the statute executed the use by converting the equitable 
title of the cestui que use into a legal estate by 
20 
transferring the seisin and the legal title from the feoffee
to the cestui que use.51 This governing idea of the Statute
of Uses reads: 
Where any person or persons stand or be siesed . . .  to
the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or 
persons or to any body politic . . .  that in every such
case all and every such use in fee simple, fee tail, 
for term of life or for years . . .  or in remainder or 
reverter shall stand and be seised . . .  in lawful 
seisin estate and possession of the same . . . lands 
. to all intents of and such like estates as they 
had or shall have in the use.52 
The next two clauses of the statute declare that in cases 
where multiple persons are jointly seised to the use of one 
of them, or where persons are seised to herediments to the 
use that other persons would enjoy the rents of the hered­
iments; the legal estates will be vested in the cestui que 
use to the extent of his interest.53 Clauses 4-7 stipulate
that a wife who held lands settled jointly by her and her 
husband or who was the beneficiary of a use held jointly 
with her husband must choose between collecting from the 
joint settlement or suing for dower. Clause 9 states that 
all devises made before May 1, 1536 were to remain valid. 
Clause 10 establishes May 1, 1536 as the date from whence 
the king may collect primer seisin, livery, ouster le main, 
fines for alienation, reliefs, or heriots from the uses of 
land converted into legal estates by the statute. From the 
same date the lords were to be entitled to fines reliefs 
and heriots from estates executed by the statute. Clause 
11 ensures the cestui que use all rights of legal action 
54 against feoffees which he possessed before the act. 
21 
Before the Statute of Uses if Martin enfoeffed Tim to 
hold the University of Richmond to the use of John, then 
Tim would hold the legal title of the University and John 
would possess the equitable title which would afford John 
the occupation and benefits of the estate, but not the 
liabilities such as tenure which were associated with the 
legal title. Furthemore, John, the cestui que use, would 
have the privilege of disposing of the University of Rich­
mond by will. After the Statute of Uses was passed, the 
statute would execute the use, and therefore, Tim would 
become merely a conduit in a transaction in which John 
would be granted the legal and the equitable titles of the 
University. Thus, John, as full owner of the legal estate, 
would be assessed for all feudal incidents and would be 
subject to forfeiture for treason. In addition, poor John 
would lose his right of disposing of the University of 
Richmond by will_SS 
The Statute of Uses was supplemented by the Statute 
of Enrollments (1536) in order to prevent secret oral trans­
actions of land through bargain and sale. The Statute of· 
Enrollments required that every bargain and sale of a free­
hold or inheritance estate be made in writing, put under 
seal, and enrolled within six months of the date of the deed 
in either a Court of Record or in the county where the lands 
are located.
56
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The Statute of Enrollments is a weak version of a draft 
proposed at the same time as the Statute of Uses. The pro­
posed draft was a much more comprehensive and thoroughgoing 
scheme of land registration than the Statute of Enrollments, 
and it promised to establish an efficient system of enroll­
ment which gave enrolled documents the same force and effect 
as evidence acknowledged before a Court of Record. Holds­
worth remarks that, "The causes which render a scheme of 
registration so difficult today are largely the result of 
the failure to pass the bill proposed in 1536.1157 The more
comprehensive scheme of registration was not as ardently 
pursued by the Crown as the Statute of Uses because its 
financial interests were not as acutely involved. 
Thus, the Crown's battle to acquire the feudal inci­
dents which were deprived it through uses lasted the length 
of the Reformation Parliament. Between 1529 and 1533 the 
Crown attempted to obtain jurisdiction of uses through . 
Parliamentary legislation. When Parliament proved unsympa­
thetic to the Crown's desires, Henry VIII abandoned efforts 
to legislate a statute regulating uses, and instead turned 
to the judiciary for support. Henry both threatened and 
bribed the Chancery in order to gain sanction of his ideas 
regarding uses. Then through Lord Dacre's case he success­
fully managed to establish a ruling which negated the terms 
of the Dacre will. The Dacre decision overturned prior 
Chancery rulings supporting the cestui que use,and·destroyed 
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the basis of most proper�y settlements in England by declar­
ing that a use which deprived the king of his feudal 
incidents was illegal. The irresolute condition of land 
settlements frightened landowners and made passage of a 
statute defining property ownership and obligations imper­
ative. As a result, the Crown was able to surpass the terms 
of its 1529 compromise with the nobility and demand all 
feudal dues payable rather than one third. The Statute of 
Uses not only stipulated that incidents of tenure be thus 
paid to the Crown, but prohibited the right to devise real 
property by will. The immediate effects of this legislation 
were the transference of the jurisdiction of uses to the 
courts of common law, impetus of landowners to join in the 
agitation against the Crown which led to the Pilgrimage of 
Grace, and the genesis of new forms of land conveyance based 
upon deed rather than livery. 
Most legal historians attempt to establish that the 
Statute of Uses was passed due to the efforts of either the 
common lawyers or the common law judges to obtain jurisdic­
tion over cases involving uses. It does not seem plausible 
that the common lawyers would have desired such a change as 
they often appeared before the Chancery, and since many of 
them were landowners, the common lawyers stood to lose more 
through the payment of tenure than they would have gained 
through representing cases involving uses. As many of the 
benefits of conveyance through use were to be alleviated by 
the Statute of Uses, the lawyers would have anticipated a 
decline in cases after the statute was passed. Further­
more, the common lawyers in the Corrnnons in 1536 amounted 
24 
to only one-fifth of the total body, and it is unlikely 
that this relatively small percentage of lawyers could have 
significantly altered the Corrnnons' general opposition to 
legislation dealing with uses.58 A more plausible explana­
tion is forwarded by E. W. Ives who asserts that the 
government played upon the jealousy of the common law judges 
for the considerable amount of litigation relating to land 
which the Chancery received as a result of their protection 
of the cestui que use. Only the sergeants-at-law and the 
common law judges benefitted from the transfer of uses to 
the corrnnon law courts, as one gained a theoretical monopoly 
of civil litigation and the other profited from an increase 
in fees which the business transferred from the Chancery 
brought.59 Thus, it is most likely that the common law
judges took advantage of royal backing to secure jurisdic­
tion over uses. It is important to note that the Lord 
Chancellors during the debate and passage of the statute, 
Thomas More and Thomas Audley, were common lawyers rather 
than ecclesiastics. Their support of royal wishes regarding 
uses may be the result of their connections with the courts 
of common law. 
The landowners constitute the group most severely 
affected by the Statute of Uses as, "the advantages secured 
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by the king were diametrically opposed to their inter­
ests.1160 Though the landowners retained the use and entail,
uses could no longer be incorporated as a means of devise, 
and bargain and sale of freeholds and fees were required 
to be publicly enrolled. The loss of the devise and secret 
land conveyances is one of the primary factors which pre­
cipitated the participation of the landed gentry in the 
Pilgrimage of Grace.61 Holdsworth states that:
The repeal of the Statute of Uses figures in the 
demands of the rebels, and it appears from the depo­
sitions of Aske and others that it was the abolition 
of the power of devise which was one of the chief 
causes which induced the landed gentry--the natural 
leaders of the counties--to side with the rebels. 62
The extent to which the landed gentry participated in 
the Pilgrimage of Grace signifies the general discontent 
landowners experienced through the loss of their traditional 
privileges of conveyance through uses. Henry VIII could 
not afford to alienate this powerful component of English 
society because the landed gentry were integral to the 
administration of justice and to the enforcement of policy 
on the local levels of government, and they were politically 
powerful in the House of Commons. Therefore, after having 
suppressed the Pilgrimage of Grace, and having obtained rev­
enue from the dissolution of Monasteries {1536, 1539), Henry 
conciliated· the gentry through gifts or sale of land and 
through the Statute of Wills (1540). 
The Statute of Wills, passed in the April-July 1540 
session of Parliament, negated much of the royal gains 
accrued through the Statute of Uses. The preamble to the 
Statute of Wills details the inconveniences placed upon 
subjects who were not able to: 
use or exercise themselves according to their 
estates, degrees, faculties, and qualities, as to 
bear themselves in such wise as they may conveni­
ently keep and maintain their hospitalities and 
families, nor the good education and bringing up 
of their lawful generations . . .  they were not 
able of their proper goods . . . to discharge their 
debts, and after their degrees set forth and advance 
their children and posterities. 63
To alleviate these problems, the statute conferred: 
full and free liberty, power and authority to give, 
dispose, will and devise, as well by his last will 
and testament in writing or otherwise by any act or 
acts lawfully executed in his life, all his . . .  
herediments at his free will and pleasure to those
who held land by socage tenure. 64
Two-thirds of land held by knight service could be simi­
larly devised. Other clauses afforded tenants who were 
lesser lords similar rights. The right of the king to a 
third of wardship, and of the other lords to wardship of a 
third of the lands was retained. Dower was to be deducted 
from the two-thirds which was devisable. Wills were to be 
constructed in written form. They were not required to be 
signed by the testator, written in his hand, or witnessed. 
The will was revocable and inoperative until the death of 
the testator, but it was not applicable to property which 
the testator acquired after the execution of the will. 65
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In all circumstances the king retained his rights to primer 
seisin, reliefs, fines for alienation, and other feudal 
dues. The Court of Wards, established through separate 
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legislation in the same parliamentary session, was endowed 
with administrative and judicial powers for the express 
purpose of managing feudal revenues and enforcing the rights 
of wardship and marriage, especially as affected by the 
Statutes of Uses and Wills. 
The effect of the Statute of Wills was to enact a sys­
tem of land reform which closely mirrored the compromise 
made between the Crown and the peers between 1529 and 1531. 
The major difference between these two reforms is that 
whereas the compromise assumed the continuous existence of 
uses, the Statute of Wills is a concession by the king 
granting his subjects the right to devise lands.66 A fur­
ther concession, the right to devise socage lands, was also 
allowed by the statute. Thus, the land reforms which were 
unacceptable to the Commons in 1532, and which were unac­
ceptable to the Crown in 1536, now became the law in 1540.67
The Statute of Uses is significant because it marks the 
first time in modern English history that the devise of a 
legal freehold interest in land could be created by will to 
begin in the future.68 
Besides contributing to the landowners' involvement in 
the Pilgrimage of Grace and hastening passage of the 
Statute of Wills, the Statute of Uses introduced new forms 
of conveyancing into the co!Illilon law. These new types of 
conveyancing gave the connnon law greater flexibility and 
served to undermine obsolete forms of transfer such as
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primer seisin. Furthermore, these conveyances permitted 
interests to be created in future. Among the more impor­
tant modes of transfer created by the Statute of Uses are 
conveyance to oneself, bargain and sale, lease and release, 
covenant to stand seised, and springing and shifting inter­
ests. It is through the creation of these forms of 
interests in land that the Statute of Uses achieved its 
greatest impact upon English law and that the Statute of 
Uses is of considerable interest to the modern legal his­
torian. 
Before the Statute of Uses a man could not convey an 
interest to himself or his wife at common law. After the 
Statute this process was found to be valuable in changing 
trustees or settling property on marriage. 
A person seised in fee simple is able to convey the 
property to trustees to the use of himself and his 
heirs till marriage, and from after the marriage to
the use of himself for life, with remainder to the 
use of his eldest and other sons successively in 
tail, with remainder to his right heirs.69 
This method of conveyance is still utilized in the formu­
lation of modern wills. 
The ba�gain and sale was perhaps the most important 
form of conveyance in the period immediately preceding the 
enactment of the Statute of Uses. By the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, it was commonly recognized that if Tim 
bargained and sold his lands to John, but no connnon law 
land conveyance was made, then Tim would be seised to the 
use of John. In the eyes of the connnon law, the bargain 
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and sale did not pass seisin, but equity, following laws 
relating to bargains and sales of chattels, established the 
doctrine that a bargain and sale of land passed the use.
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If Tim bargained and sold land to John after the Statute of 
Uses, the use created would vest both the legal and the 
equitable titles of land in John. Thus, John would be 
responsible for feudal dues, but now land could be trans­
ferred at common law without the burdensome practices of 
livery of seisin, entry, and attornment.71 The fact that
one could transfer land by a bargain and sale, which could 
be oral and perhaps secret, necessitated the passage of the 
Statute of Enrollments.72 Nevertheless, parties could
gather in a lawyer's office, draft a bargain and sale "deed," 
transfer money, and the purchaser would have possession of 
the land as the Statute of Uses would automatically execute 
73 the use. William Walsh recognized the revolutionary 
effect of the bargain and sale and remarked that, "The 
Statute, therefore, may fairly be regarded as the means, 
historically, by which conveyance by deed as distinguished 
from conveyance by livery of seisin was introduced into 
law.1174 
An ingenious method was developed from the bargain and 
sale whereby the conveyancers could effectively avoid both 
livery of seisin and enrollment. This method, lease and 
release, was initiated by the vendor making a bargain and 
sale for a year to the purchaser. The bargain and sale 
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would subsequently raise a use in the purchaser which would 
be executed by the Statute of Uses. The purchaser thus 
received the legal title to the estate, but if a deed of 
reversion was made to the purchaser, the transfer would 
effectively escape enrollment as the estate created was not 
one of freehold. Furthermore, the estate would be validated 
without the process of livery of seisin. This loophole in 
the Statute of Uses gained popularity in the later part of 
the sixteenth century. After the 1620 decision in Lutwich 
v. Mitton that a legal title could be gained without entry,
the lease and release became the most popular form of land 
conveyance, and it remained so until 1845. Usually a bar­
gain and sale for nominal consideration was negotiated, then 
a release, dated one day later, was included in the same 
document. 
The covenant to stand seised is another method of 
transferring title which was altered by the Statute of Uses. 
The history of the covenant to stand seised dates from the 
medieval period and has been the source of much legal con­
troversy. The fundamental question of the covenant's 
validity lies in whether a use can arise in a transaction 
not based upon "valuable" considerations such as money or 
the equivalent, but upon "good" considerations such as mar­
riage or blood relationship. Before the sixteenth century, 
equity would not interfere on behalf of the cestui que use 
unless a valuable consideration was involved.75 Throughout
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the sixteenth century, the courts vascillated in their 
interpretation of the covenant to stand seised. Finally, 
in the case of Gallard v. Gallard (1597), the Exchequer 
Chamber reversed the Kings Bench and declared that a con­
tract to make a use based upon natural love and affection 
must be declared under seai.76 Thus, if John covenanted to
stand seised of land to the use of Joanne, his wife, a use 
was created in Joanne, and was duly executed by the Statute 
of Uses. Joanne would become the legal owner of the estate 
without completing the processes of livery of seisin, 
enrollment, or of payment of valuable consideration.77
Before the Statute of Uses, a connnon law freehold 
could not be created to connnence in futuro except by 
reverter or remainder upon the termination of an estate and 
h . h 
. f 78 t e passing at t e same time out o a grantor. However, 
after the Statute of Uses, springing and shifting interests 
could create future legal estates upon the happening of an 
event or in derogation of a previous estate. A springing 
interest is an interest which can be created to begin at 
the occurrence of an event such as a marriage, birth, or 
specified date. Thus, if Tim granted Ryland Hall to the 
use of Frances and her heirs for the use of John and his
heirs from September 1, then there would be a resulting use 
in Tim since no valuable consideration was passed, and Tim 
would possess the legal estate as executed by the Statute 
of Uses until September 1. After Septe�ber 1, the legal
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estate would "spring" automatically to John. A shifting 
interest is an interest in an estate which passes from one 
person to another at a future time as on the occurrence of 
a particular event. For example, a legal estate might be 
conveyed through use by limiting the fee to John and his 
heirs to the use of Tim and his heirs, with a proviso that 
when Martin gets married, the land shall be to the use of 
Hartin and his heirs. In this case the use will "shift" 
from Tim to Martin upon the event of Martin's marriage and 
would terminate Tim's prior possession of the estate. Both 
springing and shifting interests may be raised by wills 
where they are designated as executionary interests. As 
the springing and shifting interests took possession by 
divesting a prior interest, they form a distinct facet of 
the connnon law relating to future interests.79
The Statute of Uses further contributed to the flexi­
bility of the disposition of property under connnon law by 
establishing the power of appointment. The power of 
appointment is not itself a future interest, but it is a 
devise which provides for the distribution of property in 
futuro.80 The power of appointment could be conferred by
John making a bargain and sale to the use of Tim and his 
heirs until and in default of Frances' exercise of a power 
of appointment, and an exercise of such power to such per­
sons as Frances might appoint by will or deed.81 The
Statute of Uses would vest a fee simple in Tim subject to 
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Frances' exercise of power. When Frances exercises the 
power of appointment, the fee will automatically shift from 
Tim to whosoever Frances designates as appointee(s). Thus, 
the power of appointment authorizes the person or persons 
exercising such power to create a use which takes effect in 
derogation of a prior use, in favor of such person, and for 
such estate, as designated by the subsequent act of the 
donee of the power.82 
Thus, the Statute of Uses created new interests in land 
which were not as strictly defined as previous common law 
conveyances. It has been seen that these new interests 
imbued the law with flexibility and promoted more efficient 
means of property transfer. Nevertheless, the statute also 
brought a serious problem into the law--that of holding land 
in perpetuity. Contingent remainders could be destroyed at 
common law, but executory interests created by the Statute 
of Uses could not, and thus, they could be created to vest 
at some indefinite (and remote) period in the future.83 The
prospect of rendering land inalienable was quickly attacked 
in the courts, but early efforts to overrule perpetuities 
created by executory interests proved unsuccessful. Finally, 
in the Duke of Norfolk's Case (1681), the Rule Against Per­
petuities was established. This rule has subsequently been 
the subject of much controversy and legal debate. Simply 
stated, the rule negates any "contingent" interest created 
in a transfer which is not certain to vest within the life 
of the person living at the time the interest is created, 
plus twenty-one years.84 Until the Rule Against Perpetui­
ties, an estate could be created which was in essence 
nondestructible, and hence, the title to the estate was 
vague. 
34 
Before an assessment of the Statute of Uses can be 
completed, it is imperative to consider the types of convey­
ances through uses which were regulated by the statute 
and their effects upon English law. The three types of 
conveyances not covered by the statute are active uses, 
uses declared in chattel interests, and uses upon a use. 
Active uses were not placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Statute of Uses because the feoffee did not merely serve as 
a conduit in this transfer; rather, he performed active 
duties. For an active use to arise, the feoffee must be 
entrusted with a responsibility such as conveying land, 
collecting rents, or protecting the property. The allow­
ance for the active use to operate outside of the Statute 
of Uses enabled land to be conveniently transferred for 
d . . . 85 a ministrative purposes. Uses declared in chattel inter-
ests were not covered by the statute because the statute 
requires that seisin be passed from the feoffer to the 
feoffee to the cestui que use, and a person cannot be seised 
of a chattel. Therefore, the legal title to the chattel 
will vest in the person to whom it is transferred regardless 
of an expression of intent to create a use.86 The most
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important type of transfer not covered by the statute is the 
use upon a use. A use upon a use could be raised by John 
enfeoffing Tim in fee simple, to the use of Martin in fee 
simple, to the use of Frances in fee simple. Immediately 
after the Statute of Uses the courts would declare that the 
legal title belonged to Hartin and that the use in Frances 
was void. This doctrine was firmly established in Tyrrel's 
Case (1557) where the Court of Wards, with the sanction of 
the judges of the Court of Connnon Pleas, ruled that the 
second use was null.87 The Chancery did not interfere with
the ruling on the use upon a use for about one hundred 
years; but by the middle of the Seventeenth century, Chan­
cery began to consistently enforce the equitable interest 
of the second cestui que use when precedent for the support 
of the equitable interests of the second cestui que use 
was established in Sambach v. Dalston (1637).88 Thus, we
have a situation similar to that before the enactment of 
the Statute of Uses as the equitable and legal titles of 
ownership once again may be separated through the use upon 
a use. The Chancery's enforcement of the use upon a use 
signals the beginning of a new era in the evolution of the 
law of property as the use upon a use is the foundation of 
the modern trust. The· trust is created in much the same 
way as a use; the only difference is that the feoffee of 
uses is now termed the trustee, and the cestui que use is 
now called the beneficiary.89
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In final analysis, the Statute of Uses did not fully 
attain the intended purpose of the Crown. Henry VIII was 
not able to perpetuate total collection of feudal incidents, 
and as a result, had to revert to a more moderate fraction 
of one-third of the incidents. In order to enforce the 
collection of tenure, Henry had to establish the Court of 
Wards whose administrative cost further depleted his oargin 
of profit from feudal revenue. Due to the administrative 
functions of the Court of Wards, and to the provision that 
monastic lands he sold as tenants-in-chief, the net income 
from feudal incidents rose from 4,434 in 1542 to an 
average of only 7,700 per annum in the first three years 
of reign of Edward VI.
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Henry VIII did accomplish the
union of equitable and legal titles of ownership through 
the Statute of Uses during his reign, but less than a cen­
tury later, the use upon a use effectively separated these 
titles in a manner similar to conveyances to uses before 
the statute. The Statute of Enrollments neither insured 
the simplification of the law of property, nor eliminated 
secret conveyances as methods such as the lease-release 
were soon instituted as a means to avoid the rather weak 
statute. Furthermore, Henry's elimination of all rights to
devise property by will contributed to the landowners' sup­
port of the Pilgrimage of Grace. The extreme reaction to 
the Statute of Uses instigated the conception and passage 
of the Statute of Wills. Thus, Henry's attempts to secure 
legislation over uses were only partially successful, and 
his efforts yielded no substantial increase in royal 
revenue. 
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Although the Statute of Uses did not realize its 
desired end, it is still of extreme significance to English 
law. The Statute of Uses is exemplary of the unplanned 
growth of legislation as the statute served to create, 
expand and interpret many areas of law including Property, 
Contracts, Future Interests, Wills and Trusts. While estab­
lishing the modern day conception of real property, the 
statute introduced a much needed elasticity into the connnon 
law by legitimatizing new ways to transfer land such as the 
conveyance to oneself, bargain and sale, covenant to stand 
seised, and the lease-release. These new methods of con­
veyances could be transacted in a lawyer's office and did 
not require physical entry upon the land. Therefore, they 
have been termed "the catalysts which called forth the 
modern deed.1191 Although the Statute of Enrollments did
not comprehensively eliminate the ability to perpetrate 
fraud or secret conveyances, it did provide a mechanism 
through which these deeds could be registered and made 
legally binding. The Statute of Uses also introduced into 
the connnon law the ability to create interests in future. 
These conveyances, termed springing and shifting interests, 
enabled estates to be created at a future date, upon the 
occurrence of a future event, or to transfer estates from 
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one holder to another at a future time. Initially, they 
allowed land to be held in perpetuity, but this defect was 
corrected in 1681 when the Rule Against Perpetuities was 
conceived in the Duke of Norfolk's Case. The Statute of 
Wills is significant because it marks the first time in 
modern English history that real property could be devised 
by common law. The Statute of Wills provided for the cre­
ation of springing and shifting executionary interests 
analogous to springing and shifting interests. The doctrine 
of powers of appointment and revocation stemmed from and 
strengthened the effects of this statute. Finally, a defect 
in the Statute of Uses, its failure to regulate a use upon 
a use, became the foundation of the modern law of trusts. 
The slow evolution of the use upon a use until the rights 
of the second cestui que use became protected by Chancery 
in the middle of the seventeenth century forms an exciting 
study in the growth of legislation itself. In short, the 
Statute of Uses signifies the beginning of a new epoch of 
property law. The medieval conceptions of prerogative own­
ership and wardship were destroyed, and the modern concep­
tion of pr�vate property was created as a result of the 
Statute of Uses. The Statute of Uses led to the abolition 
of the tenure system in England, and to the institution of 
land conveyances which provided for fluid and efficient 
buying, selling, and disposing of real estate, Thus, the 
Statute of uses has been considered by many as, ''perhaps 
the most important addition that the legislature has ever 
made to our private law.1192 Although Henry VIII may have
wished that he had never spent the later half of his reign 
striving to achieve control over uses through legislation 
and then trying to minimize the undesirable effects of the 
Statute of Uses through further legislation, the modern 
landowner has much to be grateful to Henry for because the 
advent of the Statute of Uses is the cornerstone of the 
modern interpretation of property rights and privileges. 
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